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Cleveland Board Of Education v. Loudermill:
Procedural Due Process Protection For Public
Employees
I. INTRODUCTION
The procedural due process safeguards that must be afforded public employees
have been uncertain since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Board of
Regents v. Roth,' which recognized that a public employee's constitutional property
interest in continued public employment requires "some kind" of due process
protection. In its most recent decision involving the issue, Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill,2 the United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio statute3
governing the discharge of state civil service employees plainly creates a property
interest in continued employment for those public employees protected by the
statute.4 The Court further held that the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments require that a person cannot be deprived of his or her substantive rights
to life, liberty, and property except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures,
and that the state statute from which the property interest is derived cannot dictate
which procedures are adequate. 5 Thus, the Court held that because those public
1. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
2. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
3. Oo REV. CODE Ar,,. § 124.34 (Page 1978). Section 124.34 provides in part:
The tenure of every officer or employee in the classified service of the state and the counties, civil service
townships, cities, city health districts, general health districts, and city school districts thereof, holding a
position under this chapter of the Revised Code, shall be during good behavior and efficient service and no such
officer or employee shall be reduced in pay or position, suspended, or removed, except as provided in section
124.32 of the Revised Code, and for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct,
insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, violation of such section or the rules of
the director of administrative services or the commission, or any other failure of good behavior, or any other
acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. A finding by the appropriate ethics commission,
based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts alleged in a complaint under section 102.06 of the
Revised Code constitute a violation of Chapter 102.02 of the Revised Code may constitute grounds for
dismissal. Failure to file a statement or falsely filing a statement required by section 102.02 of the Revised Code
may also constitute grounds for dismissal.
In any case of reduction, suspension of more than three working days, or removal, the appointing authority
shall furnish such employee with a copy of the order of reduction, suspension, or removal, which order shall
state the reasons therefor. Such order shall be filed with the director of administrative services and state
personnel board of review, or the commission, as may be appropriate.
Within ten days following the filing of such an order, the employee may file an appeal, in writing, with the state
personnel board of review or the commission. In the event such an appeal is filed, the board or commission shall
forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a trial board to hear, such appeal within thirty
days from and after its filing with the board or commission, and it may affirm, disaffu', or modify the
judgment of the appointing authority.
In cases of removal or reduction in pay for disciplinary reasons, either the appointing authority or the
officers or employee may appeal from the decision of the state personnel board of review or the commission to
the court of common pleas of the county in which the employee resides in accordance with the procedure
provided by section 119.12 of the Revised Code.
See also Oeo REv. CODE Am,'. § 124.11 (Page 1978).
4. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1491 (1985).
5. Id. at 1493; "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . U.S. Co.,sr. amend. V; "[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . U.S. CosT. amend. XIV, §1.
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employees protected by the statute possess a property interest in continued employ-
ment, the due process clauses require "some kind of hearing" prior to discharge. 6
The need for a hearing is evident, the Court found, from a balancing of the competing
interests at stake: the private interest in retaining employment, the governmental
interests in expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and avoidance of
administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination. 7 Although the Court
directed that a pretermination hearing is necessary, it failed to delineate what
procedural due process is necessary beyond notice and an opportunity to respond.
This Comment examines (1) the development of judicial recognition of a
property interest in continued public employment; (2) the evolution of the require-
ments of procedural due process in the discharge of public employees; and (3) the
holding and implications of the Loudermill decision in the area of public employ-
ment.
II. RECOGNITION OF A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, the constitutional rights of public employees were governed by the
"doctrine of privilege." Under the doctrine of privilege, courts considered it a
privilege rather than a right to retain employment in government. Thus, because
public employment was considered a privilege, the government could deny an
individual this privilege through discharge for no reason, and without complying with
any constitutional standards. The public employee had no constitutional protection.
The relationship between public employment and the Constitution was described by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a member of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.s In McAuliffe, the court
dismissed an action brought by a discharged policeman who had violated a police
department regulation forbidding political comment both on and off duty. 9 Justice
Holmes stated:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not
agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied
terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms
which are offered him.' 0
6. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1493 (1985).
7. Id. at 1494.
8. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. See also Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 (1901). The Court in Reagan
held that the absence of causes for removal in a statute creating the position of commissioners in the Indian Territory (later
Oklahoma) precluded any right to due process protection. "The inquiry is therefore whether there were any causes of
removal prescribed by law, March 1, 1895, or at the time of the removal. If there were, then the rule would apply that
where causes of removal are specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period,
notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as
it deemed sufficient." Id. at 425.
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Thus, public employment was a privilege for which the individual surrendered his or
her constitutional rights and, as a result, no constitutional relief was available if the
individual was discharged."
As late as 1951, the United States Supreme Court continued to use the
right/privilege distinction in determining whether discharged public employees are
entitled to due process protections. In Bailey v. Richardson,'2 a per curiam decision,
the Court affirmed a District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision which
found civil service employment to be a statutory privilege, not a constitutionally
protected right. 13 However, the Warren Court in the late 1950s and 1960s moved
away from a focus on the actions of government to a focus on the nature of the interest
asserted by the individual. With this new focus, the Warren Court repudiated the
right/privilege dichotomy as applied to public employment in Bailey. In a series of
cases, the Court dealt with the issue of which due process protections a state must
observe before it may constitutionally infringe upon the liberty and property interests
of individuals. These cases laid the foundation for the Court's recognition of a
property interest in continued public employment.
In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,14 decided in 1956, the Court held
that a discharged public employee's due process rights were violated when he was
summarily fired for invoking his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
while being questioned about his affiliation with the Communist Party.' 5 The Court
found that requiring Slochower to answer the questions would place an unconstitu-
tional condition on public employment. 16
In Greene v. McElroy,' 7 the Court found a presumption of due process in a
statute governing a public employee.' 8 In Greene, the Court was confronted with a
petition from a discharged engineer who had been precluded from the continued
practice of his profession by the government's denial of a security clearance. This
denial was made without affording Greene an opportunity to confront or cross-
examine witnesses against him. In overriding the decision to revoke Greene's security
clearance by the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board (the government
agency authorized to make security clearance decisions), Chief Justice Warren,
writing for the majority, stated that "[iun the absence of explicit authorization from
either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive
petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of
confrontation and cross-examination."' 9 Chief Justice Warren's opinion also seemed
to indicate that Greene could have used a purely constitutional, procedural due
process claim to challenge the denial of a security clearance. 20
11. MeAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892).
12. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam).
13. Id.
14. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
15. Id. at 559.
16. Id. at 557.
17. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
18. Id. at 502-03.
19. Id. at 508.
20. Id.
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The Warren Court's movement from a focus on the actions of government to a
focus on the nature of the interest asserted by the individual during this period,
however, was not absolute. In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,21 the Court balanced
the interest of the discharged employee in keeping her position against the interest of
the state in maintaining security at a military installation, and held that due process
did not require a pretermination hearing. 22 In Cafeteria Workers, the plaintiff was a
short-order cook who, while working on a Naval base for a private employer, was
refused a security badge and therefore was not allowed to enter the base. The contract
between the government and the private employer reserved to the security officer of
the base the right to determine which employees met security regulatons, and the
contract also provided that the employer could not engage employees at the base if
they did not meet the security standards. The Court upheld the government's actions
even though it did not provide a hearing or statement of the reasons for its denial of
security clearance. 23 Cafeteria Workers, however, can be distinguished from Greene:
in the former, the discharged employee was working for a private employer on the
base and had sufficient opportunities to work elsewhere with the same employer.
Thus, Greene and Slochower foreshadowed the Court's recognition of a property
interest in public employment and the right to procedural due process protection by
failing to retreat to the notion of public employment as a privilege.
The Court's movement away from the right/privilege dichotomy toward a
consideration of the interest involved was also evident in cases involving parole
revocation, 24 seizure of goods under a writ of replevin,25 revocation of a driver's
license, 26 and termination of welfare benefits. 27 Justice Blackmun announced the end
of the right/privilege dichotomy in Graham v. Richardson,28 in which he stated that
the Court "now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether
a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or a 'privilege.' "29 This case and
the other cases discussed above heralded the downfall of the right/privilege
dichotomy 30 and laid the foundation for the recognition of a property interest in public
employment and a corresponding right to procedural due process in Board of Regents
v. Roth3l and Perry v. Sindermann.32
21. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
22. Id. at 894-98.
23. Id. at 898-99.
24. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
25. Fuentes v. Sheven, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
26. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
27. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
28. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
29. Id. at 374.
30. See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Hev. L. REv.
1439 (1968); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 Cowsm. L.
REv. 99 (1916).
31. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
32. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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III. THE RECOGNITION OF A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT-ROTH AND PERRY
David Roth was hired by the Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh as a
political science professor for one academic year. Under Wisconsin law a professor
gained the tenure rights of a permanent employee after serving four years in the
Wisconsin state college system. Rules promulgated by the State Board of Regents
provided that a decision not to renew a nontenured professor's contract need not be
accompanied by a statement of reasons, and that the professor was not entitled to a
hearing. Near the end of his contract term, Roth was informed that he would not be
rehired. Roth filed suit in federal district court alleging that school officials had
decided not to renew his contract because he had exercised his protected first
amendment right to free speech. He also claimed that the university's failure to
provide him with a hearing violated his right to due process. 33
In his majority opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth,34 Justice Stewart discounted
Roth's first amendment claim because Roth had failed to prove any specific
infringement of a first amendment right.35 Focusing instead on the status of the liberty
and property interest involved in Roth's due process claim, Justice Stewart stated:
[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing
required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine whether due
process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the "weight" but to the
nature of the interest at stake .... We must look to see if the interest is within the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.36
Justice Stewart then went on to define "property" as it applies in the context of
public employment:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules and understandings that stem from an
independent source such as the state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. 37
Justice Stewart then concluded:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must clearly have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilatera expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of
property to protect those claims upon which people rely, in their daily lives, reliance that
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the qgnstitutional right to a hearing to
provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claiins. 38
The Court found that Roth's property interest in his job was created and
controlled by his contract of employment and by the governing Wisconsin statutes. 39
33. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-69 (1972).
34. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
35. Id. at 574.
36. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 577.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 566.
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Neither provided support for a legitimate expectation of reemployment. Thus,
because Roth did not have a property interest in continued public employment, he did
not have a right to a hearing.
Using the Roth criteria, the Court found a property interest in continued public
employment in Perry v. Sindermann.40 Robert Sindermann taught at Texas state
colleges for ten years prior to the decision of the State Board of Regents not to renew
his contract. 4' The Texas state college network had no formal tenure system, but
Sindermann contended that he was entitled to a hearing under an alleged de facto
tenure system. 42 He cited in support of this contention a provision in the official
faculty guide which indicated that employment would be made permanent for those
who satisfactorily, cooperatively, and enthusiastically performed their work. He also
cited guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and
University system that provided tenure protecton to those employed in the system for
seven or more years. 43 The Court concluded that Sindermann's alleged de facto
tenure system would, if proven, establish a property interest in continued employ-
ment. 44 Thus, under the Roth analysis, this property interest would entitle
Sindermann to a statement of the reasons and a hearing prior to any dismissal so that
he could vindicate his claim to continued employment.
Because both Roth and Perry involved a failure to rehire rather than a discharge
of the faculty members, the Court did not reach the issue of which pretermination
procedures meet the requirements of procedural due process. The Court did note,
however, that "[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary,
depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the
subsequent proceedings. ' 45 The issues of what creates a property interest in
continued public employment and what procedural safeguards are required before
termination of public employment would again confront the Court.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PRocEss
Once a property or liberty interest is established, a discharged public employee
is entitled to the protection of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 46 Although due process has been the foundation of many of the
Supreme Court's decisions, the Court has never clearly defined what constitutes
procedural due process. Chief Justice Warren, writing in Hannah v. Larche,47
commented that the "exact boundaries [of procedural due process] are undefinable,
and its content varies according to specific factual contexts."48 Justice Frankfurter
40. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
41. Id. at 594-95.
42. Id. at 599-600.
43. Id. at 600.
44. Id. at 602-03.
45. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.8 (1972) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378
(1971)).
46. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
47. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
48. Id. at 442.
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further stated in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath49
that "[d]ue process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a
process.'"50
Although the concept of procedural due process is nebulous, the Court has
established some basic guidelines: "A fundamental requirement of due process is 'the
opportunity to be heard."'' 51 The opportunity must be granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.5 2 Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Mulane v.
Central Hanover Trust Co.,53 went further in delineating what he considered to
constitute due process:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.-
This uncertainty over what constitutes due process has had an impact on the field
of public employment. As discussed above,5 5 the Court in Roth recognized that when
a legitimate entitlement or property interest in continued public employment exists,
corresponding due process rights also exist. The Court, however, failed to establish
which procedures are required by due process in the discharge of a public employee.
The Court faced this issue in Arnett v. Kennedy. 56
In Arnett, the Court specifically considered the issue of the need for a
pretermination hearing. Wayne Kennedy, a non-probationary federal civil service
employee, was dismissed for allegedly making recklessly false defamatory statements
about other employees.5 7 Under the regulations governing the discharge of a federal
civil service employee,58 Kennedy was provided at least thirty days' advance written
notice prior to his removal, an opportunity to appear and answer the charges before
the official authorized to make the removal decision, and an opportunity to appeal the
decision, at which time an evidentiary, trial-type hearing was provided.5 9
In his plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stewart, stated that "[an] employee's statutorily defined right is not a
guarantee against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee as
enforced by the procedures which [the state] has designated for the determination of
the cause." 6 Kennedy was thus entitled only to those procedures provided by the
federal statute governing the discharge of federal civil service employees because his
49. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
50. Id. at 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
51. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 178, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part)
(quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
52. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
53. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
54. Id. at 313.
55. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
56. 416 U.S. 134, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
57. Id. at 136.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970), 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(a)(1986).
59. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
60. Id. at 152.
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interest in continued employment was based on his expectation that he would receive
those procedures. "[W]here the grant of substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that
right, a litigant... must take the bitter with the sweet." '6 1
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell disagreed with the plurality's conten-
tion that statutorily defined procedures for the discharge of public employees are
sufficient. Justice Powell stated that the right to procedural due process is "conferred
not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. "62 Balancing the govern-
ment's interest in expediting the removal of an unsatisfactory employee with the
individual's interest in continued employment, much like the balancing test later used
in Mathews v. Eldridge,63 Justice Powell concluded that the procedures provided
Kennedy satisfied the requirements of due process. 64
Justice White also concurred in the result, finding that while an evidentiary
hearing was not required prior to dismissal, the discharged employee deserved an
evidentiary hearing at some time, either before or after discharge. 65 In his dissent,
Justice Marshall stated his belief that the due process clause mandates a full
evidentiary hearing prior to discharge. 66 Although supported by a plurality of only
three justices, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Arnett governed the procedural due
process rights of public employees until the Court's recent decision in Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill.67
V. THE HOLDING AND ANALYSIS OF Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill
A. Facts of Loudermill
James Loudermill was hired by the Cleveland Board of Education as a school
security guard on September 25, 1979. He was classified as a civil service employee.
By statute, as a civil service employee, Loudermill could only be discharged for
"incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty... or any other failure of good behavior,
or acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office" and was entitled to an
administrative review of his dismissal. 68 On his employment application Loudermill
had stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Additionally, he had signed
his name after a paragraph at the end of the application which stated that he certified
the veracity of his responses and acknowledged that false statements would result in
his dismissal.69
61. Id. at 153-54.
62. Id. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
64. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 171 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 200-02 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
68. Oeo REv. CODE ANN. § 124.34 (Page 1978).
69. Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 552 (6th Cir. 1983).
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After one year on the job, Loudermill was transferred to a newly created
department. A routine review of his records revealed that Loudermill had in fact been
convicted of grand larceny in 1968. The Board's business manager informed
Loudermill by a letter, dated November 3, 1980, that he was being discharged for
dishonesty in filling out his job application. Loudermill contended that had he been
provided an opportunity to explain before the Board took action regarding his
employment, he could have shown that he mistakenly believed that the crime of
which he was convicted was only a misdemeanor. 70
On January 29, 1981, approximately two months after his discharge, a referee
appointed by the Cleveland Civil Service Commission held a hearing to decide
Loudermill's claims. The referee recommended that Loudermill be reinstated, but the
Civil Service Commission rejected that recommendation and affirmed Loudermill's
discharge on July 20, 1981.71 Although the Civil Service Commission's decision was
subject to review in the state courts, 72 Loudermill filed suit in the District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio in October 1981, alleging that the Ohio statute
providing for administrative review of the discharge of a public employee covered by
the statute was unconstitutional on its face because it provided no opportunity for the
discharged employee to respond to the charges against him prior to discharge, thus
depriving him of liberty and property without due process.
The district court, in a brief unpublished opinion, dismissed the suit for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, stating that because the very
statute that created the property right in continued employment also specified the
procedures for discharge, no other procedures were required and these procedures had
been followed in Loudermill's case. 73 Because those specified procedures were
followed, the court held that Loudermill was, by definition, afforded all the process
due.74
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and
remanded, holding that civil service employees have an interest in continued em-
ployment which cannot be discontinued unless the requirements of due process are
met.75 In determining whether the requirements of due process were met by the Ohio
statute, the court applied the balancing test established by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge.76 Under the Mathews test, the factors to be balanced are: the
importance of the private interest affected, the risk of error created by the use of the
procedure in question, and the strength of the governmental interest involved. 77 The
court concluded that the compelling private interest in retaining employment, com-
bined with the value of presenting evidence prior to dismissal to reduce the risk of error,
outweighed the added administrative burden of a pretermination hearing. Thus, the
70. Id. at 553.
71. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1490 (1985).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudernill, 721 F.2d 550, 559 (6th Cir. 1983).
76. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
77. Id. at 321.
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court found that the Board's failure to provide Loudermill with a pretermination
hearing violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 78
B. The Supreme Court's Holding and Analysis
The Supreme Court, by an eight-to-one majority, affirmed the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision on March 19, 1985. 79 Justice White, writing for the
majority, rejected the reasoning of Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett,
which held that the procedural due process rights of public employees may be limited
by state statutes. 80 Justice White stated that the "categories of substance and
procedure are distinct." 8' Therefore, because Loudermill had a property interest in
continued employment, he was entitled to due process--some kind of hearing." 82
Justice White's opinion then applied the three factor balancing test from
Mathews to the facts in Loudermill. The Court first determined that Loudermill's
interest in continued public employment was extremely significant, as evidenced by
the Court's past findings which "recognized the severity of depriving a person of the
means of livelihood.''83 Secondly, because "the only meaningful opportunity to
invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes
effect," the risk of erroneous discharges would be greatly reduced by allowing a
pretermination hearing. 84 Finally, "[t]he governmental interest in an immediate
termination does not outweigh these interests" because "affording the employee an
opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a significant
administrative burden nor intolerable delay.'"85
Justice White concluded that "the pretermination 'hearing,' though necessary,
need not be elaborate.' '86 It would serve only as an "initial check against mistaken
decisions.''87 Justice White stated that "[a] tenured employee is entitled to oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence,
and an opportunity to present his side of the story. "88 He further emphasized the
limitations on these procedural requirements: "To require more than this prior to
termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in
quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.''89 Justice White then found it
significant that the Ohio statute provides for a "full post-termination hearing" that
would supplement any pretermination procedures, thereby providing additional
safeguards for public employees covered by the statute. 9°
78. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 721 F.2d 550, 563 (6th Cir. 1983).
79. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
80. Id. at 1493.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1494.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1495.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1495-96.
90. Id. at 1496.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall stressed his belief that the impor-
tance of the individual's interest in continued employment mandates that the
pretermination procedure consist of a trial-type hearing with an opportunity to present
witnesses and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 91 Justice Marshall reasoned that a
post-termination hearing may not "make the employee whole again," and, thus, a
less than rigorous pretermination hearing could still leave open the possiblity of
"irreparable injury." '92
Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with Justice
Marshall that "an employee may deserve a fair opportunity before discharge to
produce contrary records or testimony, or even to confront an accusor in front of the
decisionmakers. "9 Justice Brennan dissented to a further holding of the majority that
a nine-month delay in Loudermill's post-termination hearing was not a violation of
due process. 94
Justice Rehnquist, author of the plurality opinion in Arnett, dissented. Quoting
his opinion in Arnett, he stated that "the substantive right may [not] be viewed
wholly apart from the procedure provided for its enforcement." 95 Arguing that Roth
dictated that "state law [is] the source of property interests for purposes of applying
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," Justice Rehnquist suggested
that the majority had incorrectly defined the state-created property right in this case,
and that a clearer rule is needed in the area of due process.
96
VI. THE IMPACr OF LOUDERMILL
It is difficult to conjecture what impact the Loudermill decision will have. The
decision clearly mandates that when a property interest in continued public employ-
ment is created by a state statute, the government must take one additional step, a
pretermination hearing, before discharging an employee. The Court's decision,
however, leaves open the question of the creation of property interests in continued
public employment through other mechanisms, such as an implied contract. Courts
have used an implied contract theory in dealing with wrongful discharge cases
involving private employers. 97 Whether such a theory can be applied to public
employment is unclear.
91. Id. at 1497 (Marshall, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1497-98.
93. Id. at 1499 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
94. Id. at 1502.
95. Id. at 1503 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. Id. See also Jaff, Hiding Behind the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Procedural Due Process in
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudenill, 18 AKRON L. Rav. 631 (1985). Jaff argued that the Court should have
affirmed Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy:
[Tihe Supreme Court should have adopted Justice Rehnquist's approach in Arnett because it articulates a clear
rule of law. Such clarity would have two effects. First, holders of entitlements would know what procedures
they would be afforded at the time the entitlement was granted thereby allowing them to fully appreciate the
nature and contours of that entitlement. Second, and more significantly, a clearly articulated rule would enable
the public to appreciate the political nature of the judicial process.
Id.
97. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 403 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Rulon-Miller v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue of what gives rise to a
public employee's property interest in continued employment in Henderson v.
Sotelo.98 In Henderson, the plaintiff, the discharged Chief Building Inspector of
Harlingen, Texas, brought suit against his supervisor, the City Manager, other city
officials, and the city itself, claiming that his summary dismissal deprived him of
property without due process of law. Henderson had been appointed Chief Building
Inspector by the City Manager in March 1982. On July 9, 1982, Henderson was fired
by his supervisor, the city's Director of Urban Development. At the time of his
discharge, Henderson was given a handwritten memo stating reasons for the
decision. 99
On July 15, at a meeting with his supervisor and the City Manager, Henderson
agreed to accept a three-day suspension and a demotion to the position of Senior
Building Inspector. On July 16, Henderson received a paycheck which reflected a
decrease in salary. On July 19, he delivered a letter to the City Manager refusing to
accept the demotion and suspension. By a letter dated the same day, the City Manager
informed Henderson that his employment was terminated because he would not
accept the agreed-upon position. No hearing was ever held on the issue of
Henderson's dismissal. 10
The court, in determining whether Henderson had a property interest in
continued public employment, looked, in the absence of a state law governing
Henderson's employment, to the city's charter. The charter permitted the City
Manager to preemptorily discharge an appointed officer or employee if done so with
the "advice and consent" of the City Commission. The court found that this
provision did not create a property interest in continued employment:
In this case, the properly determined purpose and function of the provision requiring the
advice and consent of the City Commissioners is to keep the Commissioners informed of the
Manager's actions and to give them an opportunity to respond when they think it
necessary-thus maintaining an appropriate balance and allocation of governmental power
between the Manager and the Commissioners-rather than to afford employees a proprietary
interest in continued employment absent a showing of just cause for dismissal.oI
Upholding the district court's dismissal of Henderson's due process claim, the Fifth
Circuit concluded:
[W]e hold that under the City Charter, notwithstanding its provisions that employees such
as appellant could be discharged only with the "advice and consent" of the City
Commissioners, appellant had no entitlement to continued employment absent good cause
for termination and had no property interest in his status as a city employee. Further, the fact
that his discharge may have violated the Charter's "advice and consent" clause does not
suffice to sustain appellant's claim of deprivation of property without due process.102
98. 761 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1985).
99. Id. at 1094.
100. Id. at 1095.
101. Id. at 1097.
102. Id. at 1098.
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In Gleason v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Weld,10 3 the
district court found that a county policy manual created a protected property interest
and a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. "Under the
provisions of this policy manual, plaintiff was a 'permanent' employee since she had
been employed by the [County] Health Department for 13 years. As a 'permanent'
employee, she could only be terminated 'for cause."'4 Thus, because she had a
"legitimate, objective expectation of continued employment," she was entitled to
"some kind of hearing" prior to discharge.' 05
Other courts have been reluctant to find a property interest in continued public
employment in the absence of a statute, contract, or implied contract clearly creating
a protected interest. In Gomez v. City of Sheridan,0 6 the district court found no
property interest in employment for a police officer who had been employed for less
than the one-year probationary period. "Since there was no property interest at stake,
the Fourteenth Amendment's protections were not implicated and the plaintiff was
not entitled to a prior hearing complying with due process."' 10 7 In Vodila v.
Clelland,10 8 the district court found that a dentist, formerly employed with the
Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities for the State of
Ohio, was an "unclassified civil servant" under the Ohio Revised Code and that,
under state law, an unclassified civil servant had no property interest in continued
employment. The court thus granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 0 9
Under the Loudermill analysis, once a property interest is established the
question then becomes: What kind of pretermination hearing complies with due
process of law? Justice White's opinion in Loudermill required only "some kind of
hearing" in which the holder of the property interest is afforded an opportunity to
respond. Justice White's opinion failed to reach other issues concerning the hearing
such as whether the discharged public employee has a right to a "neutral decision
maker; to present evidence and witnesses, and to confront and cross-examine
evidence and witnesses used by the opposition before the decisionmaker; the right to
have an attorney make the presentation; a decision based on the record; and a
statement of the reasons for the decision."' 10 These issues are being addressed by
courts in the wake of the Loudermill decision.
In DeSarno v. Department of Commerce,"' the plaintiffs were discharged from
employment with the National Weather Service for filing fraudulent travel vouchers.
The plaintiffs claimed their discharge violated their rights to due process because the
same individual acted in the capacity of both proposing and deciding official in their
103. 620 F. Supp. 632 (D. Colo. 1985).
104. Id. at 634.
105. Id. at 634-35.
106. 611 F. Supp. 230 (D. Colo. 1985).
107. Id. at 235.
108. 613 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
109. Id. at 72.
110. Note, Discharge of Employees within the State Personnel System: The Due Process Requirements for the
Deprivation of Property and Liberty, 20 \VAxE Fovesr L. Ray. 413, 422-23 (1984).
111. 761 F.2d 657 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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pretermination hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the
plaintiffs had received due process:" 12
At the pretermination stage, it is not a violation of due process when the proposing and
deciding roles are performed by the same person. The law does not presume that a supervisor
who proposes to remove an employee is incapable of changing his or her mind upon hearing
the employee's side of the case. Further, it is of interest that in this case the record refutes
DeSamo and Carter's implication that Telesetsky was biased, his investigation inadequate,
or his decision factually erroneous. At the Board hearing, Telesetsky responded point by
point to everything on which DeSarno and Carter relied in their pretermination oral and
written replies. The record demonstrates that, as deciding officer, Telesetsky carefully
considered the proferred evidence and conducted a full, impartial, and independent review
of the charges at the pretermination state. 113
Although the Loudermill decision dealt with the issue of a property interest in
employment, other courts have also been confronted with the corresponding issue of
a property interest in a specific position. The district court in Click v. Board of Police
Commissioners 4 held that a police officer who was suspended for three days for
using unnecessary force in performance of his duties had a right to continued
employment which included "the right to the office and its emoluments such as rank
and compensation." '" 5 The court concluded that the police officer could not be
"suspended from employment without pay unless given... (1) oral or written
notice of the charge; (2) an explanation of the basis for the charge; and (3) an
opportunity to present his/her side of the story."116
The court in Williams v. City of Seattle" 7 similarly found a property interest in
rank and a right to a hearing for a police officer demoted from the rank of sergeant
to police officer. The court, however, held that the police officer was not entitled to
a full evidentiary hearing prior to his demotion. 1 8
In Carter v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center,19 however, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per curiam decision, upheld the district court's
finding that "since the plaintiffs had been disciplined, but had not been discharged,
they had not been deprived of any property interest.' 120 Thus, for a hearing to be
required, the deprivation of a property interest must involve more than just ordinary
discipline.
Another issue raised by the Loudermill decision is what kind of notice of the
claims and evidence against the property interest holder is required by due process.
In Davis v. Alabama State University,'2' the court held that a state university
academic advisor was denied due process when the university president considered
112. Id. at 660.
113. Id.
114. 609 F. Supp. 1199 (,V.D. Mo. 1985).
115. Id. at 1204.
116. Id. at 1206.
117. 607 F. Supp. 714 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
118. Id.
119. 767 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
120. Id. at 272.
121. 613 F. Supp. 134 (M.D. Ala. 1985).
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other evidence in the plaintiff's personnel file in making a final decision to discharge
the advisor, without notifying him or allowing him to respond to that evidence.' 22
Thus, due process requires that the protected employee be given notice of the claims
and evidence to be used against him so that he may adequately respond.
Perhaps the most difficult issue for a court is that of fashioning a remedy for the
violation of a public employee's right to due process. In Royster v. Board of Trustees
of Anderson County School District Number Five,123 the plaintiff, discharged from
his position as superintendent of schools, claimed that his "legitimate expectancy in
continued employment included not only the right to receive the compensation
guaranteed under the contract, but also the right to actively engage in and execute the
duties of his office."' 24 The Fourth Circuit disagreed:
Royster has directed us to no authority which supports the proposition that a property
interest in the continued expectation of public employment includes the right to physically
possess a job, in defiance of the stated desire of the employer, nor has our review revealed
such authority. Indeed, to hold that Royster had a constitutionally protected property interest
in continuing to perform his services would make it impossible for a public employer,
dissatisfied with an employee's performance, but without specific contractual cause to
discharge him, to relieve the employee from his duties although willing to compensate the
employee in full. '25
Thus, the court refused to reinstate Royster to his former position.
VII. CONCLUSION
The impact of the Loudermill decision on public employment may be far
reaching. One legal commentator has speculated, for example, that the decision may
require that a public employer notify and provide an opportunity to respond to tenured
employees involved in an economic strike prior to any hiring of permanent
replacements.' 2 6 By analogy, then, Loudermill may affect any situation which
threatens a protected property interest of a public employee. On the other hand, the
decision may only govern, as some courts have held, the termination of public
employment of those public employees holding a property interest in continued
employment.
At the least, the Loudermill decision mandates that public employers provide
employees having a property interest in continued public employment with a
pretermination hearing prior to discharge. This should provide those employees an
additional check against arbitrary or hasty decisions to discharge. A pretermination
hearing has additional purposes:
Giving the employee this opportunity to be heard not only accords due process to the
employee (even though the employee may not be entitled to due process) but also serves
several other purposes. The employee may make admissions at this time which would
122. Id. at 138.
123. 774 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1985).
124. Id. at 621.
125. Id.
126. Wilson, The Replacement of Lawful Economic Strikers in Ohio, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 639, 680 (1985).
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reinforce the employer's decision if the discharge is later litigated. On the other hand, the
employee may have a good defense and the employer may wish to retract the discharge
decision. 127
Thus, the procedural due process rights of discharged employees are vindicated and
the risk of an erroneous decision diminished when a pretermination hearing is held.
Although many questions are left unanswered by the Loudermill decision, one
thing is certain-the decision will provide the basis for a multitude of cases involving
the issues of what creates a property interest in continued public employment and
what corresponding right to a pretermination hearing is required by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Lowell B. Howard, Jr.
127. Smith and Vlasicak, The Fair and Legal Way to Discharge the Public Employee, 10 CuaRREr MUt.
PROys. 265, 270 (1984).
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